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On a number of the pages on the site there are references to the views of the soldiers regarding the non-visibility of the RAF, and the problems the service had to provide air support.  
The air support available to the troops on the island was not sufficient, and this was known and commented on by Churchill in a debate in the House of Commons in June 1941.  It is unfortunate that the troops on the ground gained a poor opinion of the RAF because of their lack of visibility during the campaign.
Some detail of the preparations prior to invasion are given elsewhere, the RAF was not able to provide the support that they wanted to, and which the soldiers and sailors would indeed need.  But a major factor in all this was Wavell's requirement for aircraft in North Africa, also, it has to be said, there was no great focus on the need to hold Crete until the battle had started.  To quote the Official New Zealand history; "Indeed, from the time the battle had begun and it was too late to attempt more than small-scale help, a conviction of the importance of Crete seems to have overtaken everyone.  On 21 May Churchill had told the Defence Committee that Crete should be regarded as a key post in the Mediterranean; ....... "

On the 31 April the C-in-C Mediterranean had signaled to the Admiralty for the First Sea Lord regarding Crete, and gave his view on air support; "The Air Forces now in Crete are only very small and are being left there to provide what protection they can.  They are not being kept up to strength or given replacements so that I do not think removal of these forces will make any significant difference in the western desert whereas they may suffice to allow us to deny the Island to the enemy". (CAB 121/537 in National Archives)  The size of the Air Force on Crete was recognised as being too small, and would be withdrawn before the fighting got going.

Freyberg needed air support when the battle started and called on Wavell to do what he could because of the serious situation at Maleme, and on the 23rd two flights, each of six Hurricanes, were sent.  They were not able to help much; of the first flight only one reached Heraklion and was destroyed, of the second flight four reached Heraklion but were damaged on landing and had to fly out back to Egypt the next morning.  In addition though bombers were sent to try to do damage; a flight of twelve Blenheims made a bombing attack on Maleme on the afternoon of the 23rd and that evening a combined force of Blenheims and Marylands made a follow-up attack.  While the crew claimed to have destroyed ten JU52 transport aircraft, some German reports said there was no damage.  In real terms there were insufficient aircraft available to have any real effect, above showing that the RAF cared.  
The following is from CAB 21/1495 in National Archives and is an extract from Hansard for the 10 June 1941, a debate on the events on Crete featuring Churchill.  The extract shows Churchill's philosophy of trying, even when the outcome may be failure, he absolutely does not believe in just rolling over and giving in.  Their is insufficient air support, but dig in and keep trying.  At the end of the day, that is what got us through the war, if not successfully on Crete.
The Prime Minister.  .... It must not be forgotten that apart from the effort we made in Greece, which was very costly in aircraft, the situation in Iraq, in Palestine, and potentially in Syria, as well as the winding-up of the Abyssinian story, all made very heavy demands upon our aircraft, and the situation in the Western desert had also to be considered.  Before any rational judgment could be formed upon the disposition of our Air Force and the consequent failure to supply an adequate Air Force for Crete, it would be necessary as in the case of the anti-aircraft guns, to know not only what are our whole resources, but also what is the situation in these other theatres, which were all, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Keighley (Mr. Lees-Smith) pointed out, all intimately interrelated, and it is no use trying to judge these matters without full knowledge, and that full knowledge obviously cannot be made public, and ought not to be spread outside the narrowest circle compatible with the execution of operations.
I come to the next stage of my argument, because I am offering the House an argument, if they will bear with me as I unfold it.  I have shown them the foundations upon which we started, and I now go a step forward.  In March we decided to go to the aid of Greece in accordance with our Treaty obligations.  This, of course, exposed us to the danger of being attacked in the Western desert, and also to defeat by overwhelming numbers in Greece unless Yugoslavia played her part or unless the Greek Army could be extricated to hold some narrower line than that actually chosen.  If Greece was overrun by the enemy, it seemed probable that Crete would be the next object of attack.  The enemy, with his vast local superiority in air power, was able to drive our aircraft from the airfields of Greece, and adding this to his enormously superior anti-aircraft batteries, he was able to make those airfields rapidly available for his own use.  Moreover, as the season was advancing, many more airfields became available to him as the weather improved and dried them up.  It was evident, therefore, that the attack upon Crete, if it was made, would be primarily an air-borne attack, for which, again, a vastly superior hostile air force would be available. [Churchill states that the attack would be primarily air-borne, yet Freyberg made his ground dispositions because of his constant fear of the sea-borne threat, so depriving Maleme of the forces that may have held the airfield.  J Dillon]
The question then arose as to whether we should try to defend Crete or yield it without a fight.  No one who bears any responsibility for the decision to defend Crete was ignorant of the fact that conditions permitted of only the most meagre British air support to be provided for our troops in the island of for our Fleet operating around the island.  It was not a fact that dawned upon the military and other authorities after the decision had been taken; it was the foundation of a difficult and harsh choice, as I shall show.  The choice was: Should Crete be defended without effective air support or should the Germans be permitted to occupy it without opposition?  There are some, I see, who say that we should never fight fight without superior or at least ample air support and ask when will this lesson be learned?  But suppose you cannot have it?  The questions which have to be settled are not always questions between what is good and bad; very often it is a choice between two very terrible alternatives.  Must you, if you cannot have this essential and desirable air support, yield important key points, one after another?
There are others who have said to me, and I have seen it in the newspapers, that you should defend no place that you cannot be sure you can hold.  Then, one must ask, can one ever be sure how the battle will develop before it has ever been fought?  If this principle of not defending any place you cannot be sure of holding were adopted, would not the enemy be able to make an unlimited number of valuable conquests without any fighting at all?  Where would you make a stand and engage them with resolution?  The further question arises as to what would happen if you allowed the enemy to advance and overrun, without cost to himself, the most precious and valuable strategic points?  Suppose we had never gone to Greece and had never attempted to defend Crete?  Where would the Germans be now?  Suppose we had simply resigned territory and strategic islands to them without a fight?  Might they not, at this early stage of the campaign in 1941, already be masters of Syria and Iraq and preparing themselves for an advance into Persia?  [At the time of the debate the German move into Russia had not started.  J Dillon]
The Germans in this war have gained many victories.  They have easily overrun great countries and beaten down strong Powers with little resistance offered to them.  It is not only a question of the time that is gained by fighting strongly, even if at a disadvantage, for important points.  There is also this vitally important principle of stubborn resistance to the will of the enemy.  I merely throw out these considerations to the House in order that they may see that there are some arguments which deserve to be considered before you can adopt the rule that you have to have a certainty of winning at any point and that if you have not got it beforehand you must clear out.  The whole history of war shows the fatal absurdity of such a doctrine.  Again and again, it has been proved that fierce and stubborn resistance, even against heavy odds and under exceptional conditions of local disadvantage, is an essential element in victory.  At any rate, the decision was taken to hold Crete.  The decision to fight for Crete was taken with the full knowledge that air support would be at a minimum, as anyone can see - apart from the question of whether you have adequate supplies or not - who measures the distances from our airfields in Egypt and compares them with the distances from enemy airfields in Greece and who acquaints himself with the radius of action of dive-bombers and aircraft.
Of course, I take the fullest personal responsibility for that decision, but the Chiefs of Staff, the Defence Committee and General Wavell, the Commander-in-Chief, all in turn and in their various situations not only thought that Crete ought to be defended in the circumstances, which were fully before them, but that, in spite of the lack of air support, we had a good chance of winning the battle.  No one had any illusions about the scale of the enemy air-borne attack.  We knew it would be gigantic and intense.  The reconnaissances over the Greek aerodromes showed the enormous mass of aircraft which were gathering there - many hundreds - and it turned out that the enemy was prepared to pay an almost unlimited price for this conquest, and his resources when concentrated upon any particular point may often be overwhelming at that point.

[The debate continued.  J Dillon]