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This page is for the events and decisions taken at Freyberg's headquarters from the 23rd May onwards.  By that time things were starting to get pretty 'tight', and Ringel's force was moving in on the 4th Brigade around Galatas.
I have some work to do on this page.
To paraphrase a comment by Richard Holmes, "Amateurs talk tactics, professionals talk Logistics", and logistics are indeed the constant worry of a battle commander, especially when he has no command of the air and the Navy is taking a tremendous pounding from the enemy air force.  By the 23rd Freyberg was making Wavell aware of his problems. 
1. There were no really usable ports on the south coast suitable for large scale supply operations; those places where there was a small port, Sphakia and Tymbaki, required roads building to them before they would be properly usable .  This meant that realistically he had to continue using Suda Bay with all the risks which that entailed for the Navy.
2.  According to the New Zealand history there were in the area of Freyberg's responsibility some half million mouths to feed including Greek civilians, and he had only some 150 15-cwt trucks and 117 other various carrier vehicles.  All this and only one coast road which was under constant air attack, as well as German forces around Rethymnon and Heraklion.
3.  He estimated his supply situation in days rations remaining as; Suda Bay 10 days, Rethymnon 18 days and Heraklion 14 days.  This was assuming everyone was to be on reduced rations, below the current level of two-thirds normal rations.  He needed resupply.
In W) 231/3 in the PRO there is an interesting comment on the move of Freyberg's HQ; "On the 24th & 25th, CANEA was very heavily bombed and virtually destroyed.  It was therefore considered advisable for Force Headquarters to move to a position a few miles east of SUDA on the coastal road.  The previous Headquarters on the the heights to the east of CANEA had the advantage of a commanding view over the whole battlefield, but this advantage was outweighed by the depressing view that unfolded itself [my italics J Dillon].  The continuous stream of troop pouring into MALEME was clearly visible.  Furthermore the whole sky to the west was clouded with enemy aircraft continually diving, bombing and machine gunning our troops.  In the immediate foreground CANEA was at intervals subjected to the heaviest bombing, the blast of which shook Headquarters.  Over the hills to the east and south east lay a pall of black smoke from burning ships in SUDA BAY.  It was a distracting and unhealthy atmosphere for General FREYBURG (sic) and his staff. [my italics].  I think it was somewhat more unhealthy and distracting for the troops on the ground.
The following is an extract from a very large report in the PRO which covers all aspects of the action on Crete, the report is AIR 23/6751.  This particular extract comments on reports of comparisons between WW1 and Crete.
Last War versus Crete.
Para 20.  A comparison is sometime made between the casualties and dangers of the last war with those of the campaign in CRETE, seeking to show that in the former greater losses and dangers were borne with less loss of morale than was the case in CRETE.  Those supporting this contention hold the view that air attack has attained an importance and effect out of all proportion to its material effect.

In my (the report writer's) opinion this view is substantially correct but in making any such comparison, proper weight must be given to the following considerations which I suggest must also influence commanders in the employment of troops under conditions such as obtained in CRETE:-

(a) 100% enemy air superiority will depress any troops.
(b) Any troops, under constant air attack of considerable intensity will soon have their morale impaired.
(c) Arising out of (b) above there are no quiet areas where troops can be rested on relief and consequently the nervous strain is continuous.
(d) While it is possible to move troops by day in proper formations, without excessive casualties, the nervous strain inflicted by doing so is so great that it cannot be done frequently without seriously impairing morale.
(e) Because of (d) troops must normally move at night which results in broken or no sleep, again impairing morale.
(f) In the last war troops were usually very well protected by trenches and strongly supported by artillery.  The periods of danger were usually very short commencing from reasonably secure trenches and terminating in good shell hole cover or trenches.  Where conditions of great danger existed, reliefs were frequent.  Troops  when not actually fighting lived in almost complete security.  The enemy rarely if ever enjoyed complete superiority in any weapon.
(g) In the case of CRETE almost the exact opposite to the conditions described in (f) existed, e.g. trenches were quite inadequate and troops were inadequately supported by other arms.  The dangers from air attack were continuous.  Reliefs gave no relief from air attack, and there were no back areas immune from attack.  The enemy had complete command of the air.
I believe that the effect of the German air attacks was also made worse by the experience of the troops in Greece, where many had served before evacuation to Crete.  Although the RAF was present in the Greek theatre in some strength many of their activities took place north of the areas occupied by the troops, in their minds the RAF was not supporting them, and when they saw little friendly activity over CRETE they felt again that they were being deserted by the air force.  The constant subjection of the troops to very accurate bombing attack by the German Stukas, when they had nowhere to hide in the rocky soil of the island, should not be underestimated.  The Navy had seen how accurate and devastating this bombing could be when there were no friendly fighters to distract the Stukas.